
一:背景
1. 讲故事
前些天训练营里的一位学员找到我,说他们的系统出现了崩溃,自己分析了遍也没找到是什么原因,让我帮忙看下怎么回事?dump拿到手后,接下来就上windbg分析。
二:崩溃分析
1. 为什么会崩溃
打开dump之后,windbg 会自动定位崩溃点,输出如下:
................................................................ ................................................................ ......................................... Loading unloaded module list ........................................... This dump file has an exception of interest stored in it. The stored exception information can be accessed via .ecxr. (1cec.1984): Access violation - code c0000005 (first/second chance not available) +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | This target supports Hardware-enforced Stack Protection. A HW based | | "Shadow Stack" may be available to assist in debugging and analysis. | | See aka.ms/userhsp for more info. | | | | dps @ssp | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ For analysis of this file, run !analyze -v clr!WKS::gc_heap::find_first_object+0xea: 00007ff9`9faea3eb 833800 cmp dword ptr [rax],0 ds:00000461`0000085a=????????
从卦中的find_first_object函数来看,这是GC在寻找需要标记的对象时出现了空地址,即经典的托管堆损坏问题。。。为了验证可以使用!verifyheap命令,输出如下:
0:016> !verifyheap Could not request method table data for object 00000296DB67CFC0 (MethodTable: 0000046100000858). Last good object: 00000296DB67CEF0.
2. 为什么托管堆损坏了
从时间轴的角度来看,托管堆损坏属于第二现场,第一现场是恶意的破坏现场,由于时间不能倒流,所以从dump中我们无法看到曾经发生过的事,那怎么办呢?有一个办法就是直接看破坏现场,哈哈,这个是不是有点像法医学。。。 使用dp 00000296DB67CFC0-0x80 L20观察对象附近的破坏场所,输出如下:
0:016> dp 00000296DB67CFC0-0x80 L20 00000296`db67cf40 41816d40`414f1533 43202a65`41000000 00000296`db67cf50 414f1533`43202a65 41016d40`41016d40 00000296`db67cf60 40cf1533`40cf1533 414f1533`40cf1533 00000296`db67cf70 411fd70a`3f000000 43202a65`411fd70a 00000296`db67cf80 41016d40`43202a65 40800000`411b4fe6 00000296`db67cf90 41a00005`4247fffc 3f000000`41a00005 00000296`db67cfa0 4221c88f`41200000 00000000`411b4fe6 00000296`db67cfb0 000000be`00000000 00000523`000003ee 00000296`db67cfc0 00000461`0000085b 00000004`000007a6 00000296`db67cfd0 000003ee`000000be 0000085b`00000523 00000296`db67cfe0 000007a6`00000461 000000be`00000004 00000296`db67cff0 00000523`000003ee 00000461`0000085b 00000296`db67d000 00000004`000007a6 00000000`00000000 00000296`db67d010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000296`db67d020 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000296`db67d030 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
再回头看下错误信息,说00000296DB67CFC0处应该是方法表,结果变成了现在的很多数字,看起来像是 C++ 写入的数组,为了防止误判,我让朋友又继续抓崩溃dump,看看dump是不是具有随机性,防止南辕北辙,朋友也顺利的抓到了第二个dump。
For analysis of this file, run !analyze -v clr!WKS::gc_heap::find_first_object+0x83: 00007ff9`a077a388 833900 cmp dword ptr [rcx],0 ds:000001cc`00000666=???????? 0:094> !verifyheap Could not request method table data for object 000001C64B541738 (MethodTable: 000001CC00000664). Last good object: 000001C64B53F758. 0:094> dp 000001C64B541738-0x80 L20 000001c6`4b5416b8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b5416c8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b5416d8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b5416e8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b5416f8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b541708 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b541718 00000000`00001fe0 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b541728 000000be`00000000 00000261`00000556 000001c6`4b541738 000001cc`00000666 00000004`000005c7 000001c6`4b541748 00000556`000000be 00000666`00000261 000001c6`4b541758 000005c7`000001cc 000000be`00000004 000001c6`4b541768 00000261`00000556 000001cc`00000666 000001c6`4b541778 00000004`000005c7 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b541788 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b541798 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000001c6`4b5417a8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
从卦中看,第二个dump也是出现了类似 C++ 数组的内容,到这里基本就能断定有人有意或者无意的往托管堆写入数组内容,导致托管堆对象破坏,让朋友关注下代码中的 fixed,pinvoke 之类,截图如下:
3. 后续花絮
几天之后,朋友给我带来了一个好消息,说它通过assert断言一步一步的试,最终还真给找到了。。。大概就是 C++ 写托管堆的时候越界了,参考代码如下:
int cadx = measure_info[i].posx; int cady = measure_info[i].posy; int samplex = cadx - nSamplePosInCADx; int sampley = cady - nSamplePosInCADy; if (samplex < 0 || samplex >= nWidthSample || sampley < 0 || sampley >= nHeightSample) { continue; } int offpos = sampley / grid_ver * 5 + samplex / grid_her; //错误的 int offpos = cady / grid_ver * 5 + cadx / grid_her assert(offpos >= 0 && offpos < 25); int cad_offx = pnSubOffset[offpos * 2 + 0], cad_offy = pnSubOffset[offpos * 2 + 1];
找到当然是开心的,也确实这种问题比较难搞,不过不知道朋友为什么没有使用我推荐的 ttd 方式,毕竟它的程序有一个重要的特征,即启动后1分钟之内必崩,完全可以尝试ttd,参考如下:
0:094> vertarget Windows 10 Version 19044 MP (32 procs) Free x64 Product: WinNt, suite: SingleUserTS Edition build lab: 19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406 Debug session time: Wed Mar 12 15:12:41.000 2025 (UTC + 8:00) System Uptime: 32 days 4:35:52.688 Process Uptime: 0 days 0:00:41.000 Kernel time: 0 days 0:01:21.000 User time: 0 days 0:08:01.000
三:总结
这次事故是 C++ 操控 C# 托管对象时,C++这边数组越界导致的托管堆损坏引发崩溃,这种仅凭第二现场就能寻找蛛丝马迹的案例,真的少之又少。。。也算是不幸中的万幸吧,当然也在于朋友的不抛弃不放弃,终见曙光,调试难!